668 in Peking at the time is evident from the composition of the group, which included only two Communists and six anarchists. The shift in Li's and Ch'en's flirtation with Communism to complete acceptance of it seems to have been influenced by the Soviet Union's offer to cancel its privileges in China, by the student-inspired May Fourth Movement with its overtones of hostility toward the West, and by the arrival of the Communist agent Voitinsky in China. He saw Li at Peking in 1920 and 668 665 was referred by him to Ch'en in Shanghai. The same year at Shanghai, Ch'en was present at the meeting of some eight intellectuals who discussed the formation of a Communist Party in China. At the time, a Communist group existed at Peking as well as at several other centers. In 1921, Li Ta-chao was one of the organizers of the Chinese Communist Party at Peking.

668 With the formal inauguration of the Chinese Communist Party, its direction by the Comintern, and co-operation with the Kuomintang, Communist activities in China were centered in Canton and Shanghai. Communist influence was minor in Shansi and Hopei thereafter until just prior to the Japanese invasion of China. In concert with Communist parties everywhere, the Chinese Communists announced an anti-fascist (anti-Japan) "United Front" policy in late 1935. This program and the Nationalist

671 642 593 582 and the Marriage Law implemented.[14] Various comments on the Marriage Law inspired by the regime stress Lenin's dictum that sex relationships and family problems are not individual or small affairs but matters of great social, economic, and political significance.[15]

B. Implementation of the Marriage Law

671 582 593 369 As the Nationalist Government had made no attempt to put into effect the marriage and family provisions of its 1930-31 codes among the rural population, the spirit and provisions of the Marriage Law were new and alien to this great majority of the Chinese people. They were still bound to the traditional family and had not encountered the economic experience and education which had pushed the family in Western-influenced cities toward new types of social organization from the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, the new law offered no immediate or apparent economic benefits as had the Land Reform Law.

671 645 593 582 The result was apathy, when not open resistance, toward the reorientation of marriage and family practices among the farming population. These attitudes were as typical of most of the village cadres as of the rural people

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14. Ibid., 106, p. 15.

15. See, for instance, C.B., 275, p. 4; and SCMP, 1048, pp. 30-31.

generally.[16] However, Liu Ching-fan's criticism in 1953 of the use of force by village cadres to achieve acceptance of the new Marriage Law's provisions indicates that up to that time violence accompanied this measure as it had other measures in Communist China.[17]

The regime became aware only slowly of the failure of the Marriage Law to take automatic effect. A preliminary investigation gave such cause for concern that a thorough investigation was made at the end of 1952.[18] The results impelled the Communists to launch a drive for the thorough implementation of the Marriage Law and intensive indoctrination of the people in its principles. The movement was restricted to Han Chinese areas where land reform had been completed.[19]

Summing up the result of the campaign before the Government Administration Council on November 11, 1953, Liu Ching-fan reported satisfactory indoctrination of 80 to 90 per cent of the adults in 15 per cent of the nation's hsien and municipalities where land reform had been completed and, to a somewhat lesser degree, 60 to 70 per cent of the people in 60 per cent of similar local areas. Almost no progress was indicated in the remaining 25 per cent of the localities.[20]

16. See editorial comment, C.B., 136, pp. 3-4
17. C.B., 273, p. 4.
18. C.B., 136, pp. 3-4.
19. C.B., 273, p. 1.
20. Ibid., p. 3.

871 and administrative personnel to be used in the national reconstruction program, while the Ministry of education is responsible for the administration of teacher's training schools, regular middle (secondary) and primary schools, and adult education schools.[20] Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution, education was under the jurisdiction of a Cultural and Educational Administration of the Government Administration Council. Now, under the State Council, culture and education are separated. The Ministry of Culture continues to supervise all "cultural activites" other than education, such as the press, publication, art, drama, and so forth. That physical education is worthy of an independent commission under the State Council indicates the important position it occupies in the Communist program of youth training.

871 • 665 One significant development in the control of education by the Communist government is the role played by the Party. Although the official chain of control, as shown in Chart 3, seems to have no place for the Communist Party, Party branches on all levels are actually the authorities for interpretation of official policy and make the final decision on how a school should be run. Evidence shows that some schools report every important question to the local Party secretary before taking any action.[21] Close-range Party supervision, together with the assignment of

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20. Communist Education in the Past Five Years, Vol. I, p. 11.

21. People's Education, December 1954, p. 30.

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VI. MINORITY NATIONALITIES

563 184 It can be said that there is no minority national group in the provinces of Hopei and Shansi. However, wherever such people are found in North China, no matter how few they are in number, the Communist government is making political capital by extending them favored treatment. The Mongols and Manchus in this region are so well assimilated by the Han Chinese that no line of distinction can be drawn between them. The H__ people, mainly because of their religion, are being given every recognition by the government in order to win support of all the members of Islamic faith within China and the sympathy of those in other countries. Although it is difficult to gauge how thoroughly the scattered Hui people in North China have been convinced of the Communists' good intentions, there is no basis to assume that they are not pleased with their priviledged position as a result of the regime's policy toward minority nationalities.

VII. OTHER GROUPS

184 665 647 In addition to the groups discussed, there are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes do have a significant bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily

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have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibited intense feelings of patriotism and dedication to the "cause" in the early days of their careers, and so far they have shown no sign indicating that their feelings may have changed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, the downfall of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih in 1954 was the only serious rift in the Communist leadership. Even the Kao-Jao incident, which might have delayed repercussions in Northwest and East China, was quickly settled and left no perceptible political ripple in North China. A purge as violent as that which took place in Russia in the 1930's at present cannot as yet be predicted for China. Overshadowed by the unique personal prestige and cohesive power of Mao Tse-tung, the high-ranking Communist leaders, particularly the military, have yet to offer evidence of power-seeking at the risk of disrupting Party harmony and hegemony. This, of course, does not preclude future development of discord among Party leaders.

The personnel in lower Party echelons are subject to tremendous pressures from all sides. Even the most devoted Party workers are expected to prove their loyalty to Communism. The fact that the Party relies on close surveillance and an atmosphere of fear in order to keep members in line indicates the existence of dissatisfaction

184 and dissidence within the Party ranks. Expansion of industrial centers in China necessitates
• 665 the promotion of numerous lower-level Party
647 functionaries. This certainly tends to make the old Party cadres resentful when they see the rise of new cadres to positions equal to or higher than their own. Generally speaking, cadres assigned to rural areas are less enthusiastic about the regime than those in urban areas who live in more comfortable circumstances and have more frequent opportunities for advancement, and the amenities of a wider social life.

Former Nationalist officials had their darkest days during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when almost all lived under the imminent threat of violence and death. After these intensive campaigns had subsided, a few former Kuomintang personnel remained among the Communist government bureaucrats. There is no doubt that these former Kuomintang personnel are reminded of the necessity of proving their thorough conversion to Communism. A sense of insecurity affects this group more virulently than it does the "securely situated" segments of the Chinese population.

VIII. CONCLUSION

184 The Communist system of multiple control, which penetrates all aspects of life, and the Communist effort to maintain a strong tie with

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2c,
Political Background

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND ITS AFFILIATED ORGANS

Political dynamics, which deals with political power and political processes, has a special meaning when applied to Communist China. It is intelligible only when it is realized that the Communist Party of China is dedicated to the concentration of power in its own hands. Not only does the political process in Communist China follows a course largely determined by the organizational and operational pattern of the Party, but also the will of society itself is manipulate by the Party through the stimulation of people's enthusiasm and support. Hence, the study of political dynamics in the North China Region should examine the regional Communist Party itself, its political control, and the elections and politics of minor parties.

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The Communist Party in this region concerns itself with the maintenance of an efficient and militant Party organization which exercises its control over all types of organization. Through its well-established network of control, popular enthusiasm is aroused and the political activities of the region are regulated. The two chief means employed are the injection of issues and the

665 668 initiation of movements or campaigns. While issues are employed to capture popular attention and to agitate emotion in preparation for ensuing campaigns, movements are the means to achieve assigned goals.

Initiated by the Party,[1] a campaign calls for the concerted action among all Party organizations at all levels. A campaign is not merely a method of executing a mission, it is also a device to test the efficiency of all organs, and a means of eliminating the undesirable ones. A campaign can be either of national or local nature;[2] it may be directed toward either the population as a whole or only a segment of it. In the Communist context, a campaign should be regarded as a political device, rather than as a manifestation of political or social process.

665 The concentration of both government and Party functions is the second factor determining the pattern of political dynamics in the North China Region. Four major means are used by the

1. For a discussion of campaigns, see: Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism, the First Five Years, Yale University Press, 1955, pp. 77-100. W. W. Rostow, The Prospects for Communist China, Cambridge, 1955, pp.72-98.

2. Typical drives of a local nature are conducted in farming communities: Spring Plowing, Summer Collection, Resist Drought, Resist Flood, Autumn Harvest, and many others.

•665 central organs to hold the local organs under central direction: (1) the absolute leadership of the central organs, both state and Party, over the local organizations; (2) the effective centralized control over instruments of terror, the armed forces, the public security agencies and the peopl procuratorate; (3) the central control of mass org izations; and (4) the setting of patterns for issues and campaigns for the agitation of popular enthusiasm, and the execution of policies under centrali ized directions.

I. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA IN NORTH CHINA

The North China regional Party organizations occupy a unique position in the Party history as well as Party politics of today. For one thing, North China Party organizations have had a long and rich experience both in administration and in Party politics. Ever since the arrival of the 18th Group Army (the reorganized Communist main force of the 8th Route Army) in Shansi and Hopei provinces in 1938 at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War,[3] regional Party organizations have been active in all spheres of operations

3. K'ang-jih Chan-cheng Shih-ch'i Ti Chung-kuo Jen-min Chieh-fang-chün [The People's Liberation Army During the War of Resistance Against Japan], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953.

665 No wonder Party leaders in this region are confident and are proud of this "more than ten years' experience." North China is composed largely of so-called "old liberated" areas where the Communists have been longest in power. The "old liberated" areas became the places from which expert knowledge and trained manpower could be drawn. This facilitated the effective and rapid execution of tasks in the "newly liberated" areas of the North China region in the first few years of the Communist rule. The North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has played a leading role in national Party politics. It has shown its strength in Party policy announcements, drafts of regulations, and in Party operations. The last but not the least important fact is the region's proximity to the central organs of the Party and the Central Government. Such proximity places the regional apparatus constantly under the direct supervision of the central organs; at the same time, assistance both in terms of personnel and technical knowledge can be drawn from outside. A notable example of this outside assistance occurred during the First Conference of County Heads of the North China Region in September 1951. At this meeting, administrative experts and notable professors of the famous universities were called upon to participate in the preparation and direction of the affairs. Another advantage of this proximity has been the presence of leaders of the Central Party organs at the local Party meetings, where their assitance to the local Party organizations has been made possible.

665 Needless to say, the regional Party organizations closely adhere to the policies and directions of the Central Committee of the Party and the following three key principles can be identified:

(1) Party organizations are flexible and are under constant adjustment so as to cope with new tasks assigned to the Party units in their region.

(2) Membership drives are a constant activity of all Party branches and are carried out to attract more workers, technicians, and managerial personnel.

(3) Members of the Party are constantly exposed to Party indoctrination and training, and they are subject to the kind of rectification and remolding which results in a high loss of Party membership.

B. Party Organization

There are three chief principles governing the Party organization in the North China Region: (1) Party organization is an integrated system characterized by the extreme centralization of political power and insistence on unity and discipline. (2) Party structure is pyramidal and is organized upon a territorial and functional basis. (3) Party organization is flexible. The assumption that it is stereotyped would be misleading and unrealistic.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 12 North China
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665 1. The Layers of the regional Party Organization. Before the abolition of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in August 1954, Party organizations in this region were divided into two parts: (a) the delegates of the Central Committee of the Party to the region, and (b) the local Party bodies, divided into tiers from the provincial Party layer, administrative layer, county and city layer down to chü and hsiang (villages) layer.

In order to understand Communist Party politics in the North China Region, the inclusion of the Party Bureau in the present discussion is necessary. Until 1954 the North China Party Bureau was extremely important in regional politics. In view of the provision of the Party Constitution under which the Central Committee can establish Party Bureas at its will, the possibility of its reinstitution at some future date cannot be ignored.

a) Delegates of the Central Committee. In the North China Region, the Communist Party was represented by the North China Bureau, which had direct jurisdiction over Party organization in Hopei and Shansi provinces in 1954, and Hopei, Shansi, Suiyuan and Cahar provinces between 1949 and 1954.[4]

4. See chapter on "Geographical Setting" in Handbook for change of political division in North China Region.

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• 665 The North China Bureau exercised its authority through two channels: the Bureau Secretariat and the Regional Party Conference. While the Bureau Secretariat was the executive organ at the regional level, maintaining an organization comparable to that of the Central Committee, the Regional Conference was a device which the Bureau had not hesitated to employ for the transmission of directives and for periodic control. Departments under the Secretariat had also called meetings of their own, thereby placing the Party functions completely under their respective jurisdictions.

In addition to the Bureau's direction of Party affairs, the North China Region had been unusually active in the direction of regional politics. The Bureau took special interest in the implementation of increased agricultural production in 1950, in rural political construction in 1951, and in the industrialization programs in the cities after 1952. The Bureau's directive of March 1950 to the Pingyuan Provincial Party Committee, charging the latter with severe wrongs committed in administration was the most striking of its kind.[5] The directive not only showed the concern of the Bureau over provincial activities, but the unquestioned leadership of the

5. People's Daily, March 15, 1950, p. 1.

665 First Secretary Po I-po in the management of the Party Affairs in that region.

b) Local Hierarchy:[6]

(1) Provincial Party layer: The Provincial Party unit is the highest layer of the Party hierarchy within a province. Since the abolition of the Party Bureau, the relationship between the provincial Party organizations and the Central Party organs has become more direct. This fact strengthens the Party organization's leadership in the province.

(2) Administrative District Party layer: The Party unit at this layer generally corresponds with that of an administrative district under the provincial government. It devotes most of its work to Party affairs and holds great authority in the selection and placement of personnel -- Party as well as government -- within its jurisdiction.

(3) County and City Party layer: A dual task is assigned to the county and city Party organizations. While Party organizations at this level take an active role in the execution of Party directives, they also direct government

6. For local Party organization, see Constitution of the Communist Party of China; English text in Liu Shao-ch'i, On the Party, Peking, 1951, pp. 185-190.

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activities and maintain complete control over other administrative and mass organizations.

(4) Ch'ü Party layer: Ch'ü Party units are installed below a city or a county. Like the administrative district Party organs, they are directly responsible for the management of Party affairs and the implementation of Party policies.

(5) Hsiang Party layer: Hsiang Party units form the lowest layer of the local Party hierarchy. It is here that Party and government fusion in personnel and functions is the most obvious, and the Party control over other administrative and mass organizations most clearly revealed.

In addition to the territorial division of Party organizations -- the Central delegates to the region and the local Party hierarchy -- an organization known as Party branch, or Party cell exists in all non-Party organizations. It is organized according to functional divisions of the non-Party organization and is a part of the basic foundation upon which the Party pyramid rests. Article 49 of the Party Constitution provides that Party branches may be organized "in any factory, mine, village, enterprise, street, company of the Army, office, or school, where there are three or more members." They can be grouped into general branches and Party committees, or broken down into sub-branches and Party groups, depending upon the number of Party members and the place of operation.

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665 2. Organization within each Party layer: In each of these Party units, a quadrupartite division of the authority is maintained: the Party Congress, the Party Committee, Control Committee and the Party Conference.

a) The Party Congress: The Party Congress of each of these local units is the highest body of the Party organizations in question. In theory, Party congresses at all local levels meet every two years. The Constitution of the Communist Party states that the Party congress supervise and lead the Party Committee by hearing its report, deciding on questions pertaining to that area, and electing members of the Party Committee and delegates to the Party congress at the immediate higher level. Although the next National Party Congress is scheduled to meet in the latter part of 1956 for the first time since 1945, local Party Conferences have been encouraged to meet more frequently.

b) Party Committee: The Party Committee is the executive body of the Party unit at each level. At the provincial level, a Standing Committee is elected by the provincial Party Committee. Under the Standing Committee there are functional departments to deal with such matters as organization, propaganda, rural work, urban work and social work. In addition to the departments, there are commissions to deal with trade unions, youth and women, and offices in policy planning, military affairs and other matters. Organizations under the Party Committee at other local levels vary in each case. However, the

basic functional departments and commissions are included at all levels with the exception that there is no St anding Committee. 665•

c) Control Committees: At the National Party Conference of the Communist Party in March 1955, a new system of Control Committees was established,[7] replacing the Discipline Inspection Committee established in November 1949. Although the Control Committees are elected by the Party Committees, the ultimate authority over them lies not with the local Party Committees but with the Central Secretariat.

The Control Committee at any level may set up branch offices at any location -- in businesses, factories, cooperatives, and mass organizations. It is required to co-operate with the supervisory offices, the people's procuratorate, and the public security agencies.

d) Party Conference: The Party Conference is in fact an executive meeting of the Party unit at each level. It is convened by the Party Committee which appoints representatives to the Conference. The Party Conference has the power to appoint or to remove one-fourth of the members of the Party Committee and to reach decisions on Party work within its jurisdiction. The Party Conferences meet more often than the Party Congresses, and between sessions exercise most of the power for the latter.

C. Party Expansion, Overhauling and Indoctrination:

7. English text in New China News Agency Daily Bulletin (London), No. 1277, April 6, 1955, p. 3.

665 1. Party Expansion. In addition to the constant membership drive, there were three special major drives in the North China region: the 1950 expansion in the cities; the 1952 membership drive; and the rural expansion in 1955.

The total membership of the Communist Party in the North China Region[8] in July 1950 stood at 1,600,000, and a year later in June, it rose up to 1,800,000 -- a net gain of 200,000 members. Such an increase in the Party membership serves to illustrate the scope of the expansion taking place during this time. However, this expansion was exclusively carried out in the "newly liberated" areas--those areas seized by the Communists since 1949 -- and in the urban and mining areas. In the "old liberated" areas, Party overhauling was the major task during the same period.

The targets of this Party expansion drive were the activists in the newly liberated areas and the workers, technicians and students in the cities. In the city of Tientsin, for example, it was reported[9] that among all the state-owned factories, underground Party strength in 1949 was a little over 1.9 per cent of all the workers, technicians, etc. In June 1950 Party strength jumped to about 9.26 per cent of the total personnel.

Initiated by the directive of the Central Party Bureau[10] after the conclusion of the Three-Anti and

8. 1950 membership in People's Daily, July 2, 1950, p. 1. Speech of Po I-po, First Secretary of North China Bureau, June 29, 1951, p. 1.
9. Ibid., July 6, 1950, p. 3.
10. Ibid., Oct. 22, 1952, p. 3.

665 and Five-Anti campaigns, the 1952 Party membership drive was officially launched. It was deemed necessary, not only because of a large number of activists available after the two movements, but also because many Party members were transferred to serve in the industrial departments. In the whole region, 8,000 Party members were transferred, half of these were supplied by the Hopei Party organization.[11]

The 1952 membership drive was wider in scope than that of 1950. It was carried out in all places in the North China Region, with no restriction in either the old liberated areas or the new. Likewise, it was carried out in both cities and rural districts, although the membership drive in the rural districts did not get started until after the major overhauling of rural Party organization.

The North China Party Bureau stressed in its directive four points to be closely followed by all Party organizations in the region: (1) A longer period of preparation was needed. During this time, additional training and ideological indoctrination should be given to Party members so as to familiarize them with the significance of the expansion and the duties of each member. Secretaries

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11. Ibid., March 5, 192, p. 3.

665 of all Party units were instructed to submit expansion plans. (2) Selection, registration and training of activists constituted a necessary step toward the admission of new Party members. (3) A more lenient policy was adopted so as to encourage more applications. The "closed door" policy of the past was discouraged, but warning was given against the "blind" admission of members. A case in point is that of a transportation company in the city of Kalgan, where of 800 new members, only two were qualified after careful scrutiny by Party Committees at higher levels. (4) Strict adherence to admission procedures.

After the launching of the membership drive, many new members were admitted. In the two months between June and August, 1952, 2,500 were admitted in the city of Peking. In Tientsin, 600 new members were added; in Taiyuan, Shansi, an additional 1,000, and in Tangshan, another 500. A year later in July 1953, it was reported that [12] Communist Party membership in factories and industrial enterprises in Peking had doubled its 1952 strength. Although rural membership drives were noted, large scale expansion was not reported.

After the expansion, Party organizations in this region were instructed to conduct Party activities according to strict Party regulations and to

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12. Ibid., July 1, 1953, p. 1.

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pay special attention to the training of new members. To make Party activities conform to Party regulations involves the regular holding of Party Branch Committee meetings, periodic reports of committee work to the membership meeting, and the observation of "Party Day" and other indoctrination programs. As to the training of new members, they were required to attend training schools and to take part in all Party activities.

The third large-scale Party membership drive was initiated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party as a result of the convening of the Basic Rural Organization Conference in March 1955.[13] The Conference deemed rural expansion appropriate in view of the establishment of hsiang Party branches in 170,000 of the total of 220,000 hsiang in the nation as a whole, with a rural Party membership of four millions. In the North China region, the rural expansion was implemented as early as 1954.[14] In the nation as a whole, 700,000 peasants were admitted in 1954. In Shansi Province, 10,000 were admitted in the first half of that year.[15] The admission of more workers, technicians and intelligentsia has always been the principal task of the Party in the city. Between June-November 1954, in Peking 8,100 workers and technicians became members of the Communist Party.[16] The 1954 expansion no doubt prepared

13. Ibid., March 9, 1955, p. 1.
14. Ibid., May 19, 1955, p. 1.
15. Ibid., July 6, 1954, p. 2.
16. Ibid., Jan. 13, 1955, p. 1.

665 the way for the 1955 drive.

2. Party Overhauling. Party overhauling as a constant process involves at least four major activities: (1) examination of the ideology and political alertness of Party members; (2) review and criticism of individual work; (3) mobilization of mass participation in the criticism;(4) promotion of political education and increased study.

In North China, there was also periodic overhauling in addition to the constant process of overhauling. A case from the county of Pin-suan of Shansi was recommended to all Party organizations as a model.[17] In this case, Party overhauling was instituted four times a year according to seasonal change. At the end of each season, Party workers were examined in ideology and work. The Party Committee would call a membership meeting at which the committee made its work report, and criticism and self-criticism were developed. Activists were invited to participate in the criticism. In addition to the seasonal examinations, there was also an annual examination. At that time, a series of meetings were called, including the hsiang people's representative meeting and the hsiang government meeting. Party members were again placed under scrutiny and mass participation in the criticism was encouraged.

Another type of the Party overhauling is the overhauling drive. It can be initiated either by the

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17. New China Monthly, No. 2, Feb. 1, 1955, pp. 33-34.

665 Central Committee of the Communist Party or by the regional or provincial Party Committee, with the consent of the Central Party organs. In the North China Region, at least two regional overhaulings have taken place: the 1950 rectification and the 1952 nationwide rural overhauling.

Although the 1950 Party overhauling affected mainly Party organization in the "old liberated" area, its impact upon the Party as a whole was great. Under the July 1950 directive of the North China Bureau,[18] the central theme of the overhauling was the eradication of dictatorial acts noticed among Party members in all rural organizations. According to the instruction, Party overhauling should proceed from the provincial Party organization down to the county and hsiang Party units. Responsible secretaries of the administrative districts and county Party Committees were called to attend classes and to take charge of overhauling upon their return to their respective organizations. The directive also called for the re-election of all Party branches and the further enforcement of Party indoctrination.

The 1950 Party overhauling lasted throughout 1950 and the first few months of 1951. In the province of Hopei,[19] the preparation took four months-

18. People's Daily, July 2, 1950, p. 1.

19. Report of experiences in Hopei in Hopei Daily [Hopei Jih-pao], Paoting, Nov. 27,1950,p.1.

665 from July to October of 1950. The actual overhauling, however, took only about a month. In Shansi province,[20] 66,000 members and activists received training and 3,300 Party branches concluded the overhauling between November 1950 and June 1951.

The nationwide Party overhauling in 1952 in the rural districts was more vigorously carried out than that of 1950. The campaign was aimed at the elimination of undesirable Party members, the newly rich, the "reactionaries" and those guilty of corruption, disobedience, and dictatorial acts. In this connection, the North China Bureau issued regulations governing Party members' economic activities in the rural district[21] and the First Secretary of Hopeh, Lin Ti, made a speech calling for eradication of dictatorial acts.[22]

According to the regulations governing Party members' economic activities in the rural area, Party members who insisted on hiring peasant helpers without proper justification were to be expelled from the Party. Likewise, Party members who invested money for profit, charged a high interest on loans, or rented out land for gain, were subject to severe punishment, possibly expulsion from the Party. Other acts involving waste, corruption, disobedience and dictatorial acts were punished by laws promulgated by the Central Government.

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20. People's Daily, May 11, 1951, p. 3.
21. Ibid., Feb. 26, 1953, p. 1.
22. Ibid., Feb. 17, 1953, p. 3.

665 To prepare for the drive, Party personnel were trained and experimental overhauling was held in selected areas. In North China, 20,000 Party members were trained to participate in the overhauling of the 11,000 Party branches.[23] Of the 8,000 rural Party branches selected for Party overhauling in the province of Hopei before the end of 1952, 90 per cent were found to be in good order while the remaining 10 per cent were poor.[24] Another report[25] also indicated that out of 49,164 rural Party members, only 1,101 were involved in exploitation of poor peasants; however, a larger number of Party members had committed dictatorial acts, thereby inflicting physical harm upon the people. In the province of Shansi, as many as 15 to 20 per cent of the Party members were reported guilty.

3. Indoctrination and Training. In order to keep the Communist Party from becoming ossified and to maintain its vitality and discipline, a constant indoctrination and training program were imposed upon each Party member. The purpose of this practice is to revitalize individual adherence to Party Doctrine and to give each member additional training along the lines of his work.

In the North China region, Party training was especially emphasized. This can be attributed

23. Ibid., Feb. 2, 1953, p. 1.
24. Ibid., Feb. 17, 1953, p. 3.
25. Ibid., April 2, 1953, p. 3.

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to the fact that a large portion of the region was "old liberated" area wherein most Party members were of rural origin; they were either illiterate or possessed a feeling of self-complacency, which the Party regarded as dangerous to the fighting strength of the Party. As a result, a large-scale training program was launched in 1950 in association with the Party overhauling carried out at the same time.

In October 1949 the North China Bureau issued a directive[26] to this effect. Courses including "new democracy," "Party history," and "Party Constitution" were given at Party schools. Cultural schools were also widely established for the illiterates. As of March 1950, in the five administrative districts, 30,000 Party members and activists had received training;[27] in 15 counties in Shansi Province, another 120,000 went through the various schools. The Pingyuan Provincial Party Committee claimed that one third of the membership had taken some course.

To further this effort, a meeting of heads of the Party departments of propaganda was held in March 1950.[28] At this meeting, an elaborate training program was announced. First, to strengthen Party training at the hsiang level, training stations were to be established in ch'ü to instruct and super-hsiang training programs. Administrative district and county (or city) Party organizations were to be

26. Ibid., June 23, 1950, p. 3.
27. Ibid., March 23, 1950, p. 3.
28. Hopei Daily, March 2, 1950, p. 1.

665 responsible for the training and supply of instructors to the training stations. Classes to be given were held once every ten to fifteen days. Second, provincial Party Committees were to operate Party schools with two courses: a regular course of one year and short courses from one to three months. Political instruction was to be given at these schools to enable Party and non-Party members to become more alert politically and to increase their knowledge of current affairs. Third, cultural schools were to be organized with a view toward raising the educational level of both Party and non-Party cadres. The aim was total elimination of illiteracy within 2 to 3 years and the increase of the educational level of the cadre to the equivalent of the grade school or junior high school graduate within a 4 to 5 year period.

Cultural schools had been widely established throughout the North China Region. As early as May 1950, 41 schools had been organized in Pingyuan province alone, offering 117 courses to more than 6,000 Party and non-Party cadre.[29] Rural cultural schools were reported to number 9,700 in Pingyuan and 6,100 in Shansi.

The January 1954 directive[30] issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party no doubt strengthened the cultural training throughout the North China Region. The directive reminded Party members of the fact that in the country as a whole, one-half of the cadres had less than a junior high school education, and a portion were actually

29. People's Daily, May 10, 1950, p. 3.
30. Ibid., January 22, 1954, p. 1.

illiterate. To remedy this, a nationwide cultural school network was organized, bringing both the individual members and the responsible secretaries below county and ch'ü level into the plan. The plan called for the completion of cadre education to the equivalent of grade school or junior high school. Classes for the illiterate were also included in the program. This program has been put into practice in this region, and its administration rests mainly upon the county Party organizations.

The ideological school has a dual function -- to train Party members and to serve as a center for ideological training for Party candidates and members of mass organizations. Subjects can be taught either in the Party school or in Party branch classes. Courses given by the Party schools are either in a regular school or an evening school. Party branch schools are less formal, but all Party members are required to attend. Training classes in Party branches are governed by the December 1953 directive of the North China Bureau,[31] which particularly emphasized the strengthening of the work of the training stations and the designation of one or two Party members from the ch'ü Party Committee to be in charge of this program.

II. Affiliated Party Organizations

A. New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC)

31. Ibid., December 4, 1953, p. 1.

665 668 1. The Party and the Corps: The relationship of the Party is such that the Corps submits completely to the Party. The constitution of the Corps assures the Party of effective control by providing that Party members shall take charge of Corps organs above the county level[32] and that Corps activity at all levels shall be under the direction of Party Committees. Indeed, the New Democratic Youth Corps is the lieutenant of the Party. Its first function is to provide a reservoir of potential Party members. For example, among the Corps members in the province of Hopei in October 1950, 18,590 had become Party members.[33] To supply personnel for duties in all organizations is another obligation of the Corps to the Party. The Corps membership in Hopei province, for example, stood at 269,267 in May 1950 with 13,092 Corps branches established in all organizations.[34] The final task of the Corps is to engage in the broadest possible range of activities so as to reach all sections of society, where Party organizations are lacking. Corps organizations have existed in North China Region since 1946, While Corps members actively participated in underground youth movements in the cities, others took part in all activities in the countryside. The Peking Youth Corps, for example, was organized from the underground youth organizations. Workers in the city no doubt formed the other force for the Peking Corps set-up.

2. Organization. Organizationally, the Corp

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32. Chinese text of Constitution of New Democratic Youth Corps, ibid., July 7, 1953, p. 3.

33. Hopei Daily, Oct. 6, 1950, p. 1.

34. Ibid, May 4, 1950, p. 1.

in the North China Region follows that of the Party. 665 668
The Central Committee of the Youth Corps was represented by the North China Working Committee until its abolition in August 1954. Local Corps organs are established at the provincial, municipal, and county level. The Local Corps Committees are empowered to organize and to assign representative working committees to administrative districts and ch'ü.

With the exception of those working committees at district and ch'ü levels, the constituent Corps organs rest upon a dual authority. At each level there is a congress and a committee elected by it. These committees are the executive organs of the Corps at each level, and are responsible to both the congress of the corresponding level and the committe at the next higher level. In the Peking Corps committee,[35] eight departments and commissions were found in March 1950. They included departments of Organization, Propaganda, Youth Worker, University Affairs, High School Affairs, Young Pioneers, and Commissions on Suburb Workers and Peking Government Organs.

Like the Party, Corps organizations can also be established on functional bases. Such organizations are known as Corps branches, which can be formed in any factory, mine, enterprise, farm station, village government office, company of the Army, school, or street where there are three or more Corps members. A general Corps branch and

35. People's Daily, March 5, 1950, p. 4.

665 and Corps Committee can also be formed when
668 the size of the branch is large enough to warrant it. Corps branches can also be broken down to teams and groups whenever necessary. These basic level organs of the Corps not only serve to agitate and mobilize youth and the masses, but they also act as a substitute organ for the Party hwere Party organs are lacking.

B. The Young Pioneers.

665 The Young Pioneers as an organization com-
857 prising youth between the ages of 9 and 15 years
668 is entrusted to the leadership of the New Democratic Youth Corps. In the North China region the Pioneers claimed a membership of 16,000 as early as June 1950. The theme of the Young Pioneers was originally centered on patriotism. Since 1953, emphasis has shifted to cultural training and to further expansion. National membership was [36] given in March 1955 at 70 millions, about 15 per cent of the nation's youth in that age group.

SECTION TWO: POLITICAL CONTROL

665 The Communist Party exercises its political control in the North China Region through a network of controls, not limited to the Party organs alone, but which extend to government, industrial and mass organizations. This control is insured by placing Communist Party members in key positions in those organizations, by reserving for the Party all policy-making power, and by agitation and mobilization of various political and social forces.

36. Ibid., January 31, 1950, p. 3.

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I. PARTY CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS

A. Party and Government Fusion

665 647 The Communist Party control over government organs has been accomplished primarily by the fusion of government and Party in authority, in function, and in personnel at all levels. The chief instrument of the fusion is the subjection of all Party members in all government organizations to Party discipline and the wide establishment of Party branches in all these organizations. The functions of these Party branches in government organizations are twofold: to enforce Party directives and discipline and to instigate propaganda and indoctrination among non-Party members. The regulations governing Party branches working in government organizations issued by the North China Bureau in April 1952 spelled out these functions and techniques.[37] Seven duties were specified for Party branches in government offices, ideological training, the study of administrative techniques, adherence to all Party regulations, the strengthening of measures to safeguard security information and suppression of counterrevolutionaries, the direction of activities of the Youth Corps, and the inspection of work. These methods have generally been sufficient to assure absolute Party control over government organs and other "illegitimate" methods which might result in the disruption of administration have been strongly discouraged.

37. People's Daily, April 16, 1952, p. 3.

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647 The Party's well-established system of requiring Party members and branches to report progress and seek instructions is almost a part of administrative practice. To further the Party's control over administrative organs, the North China Bureau issued a directive establishing five further procedures.[38] (1) A Party democratic system was instituted whereby criticism and self-criticism became part of regular Party branch life with a view to strengthening Party discipline. (2) Political work and study were introduced with a view to remedying the lack of political education, especially in the economic and financial departments. (3) A personnel management system was devised to ensure the control of personnel policies in the hands of the department of organization of the Party. Appointments, transfers, promotions, and punishment of government personnel are handled by the appropriate Party department in consultation with the appropriate government department. Both senior Party members and heads of government organizations are prohibited from interfering. (4) More systematic working procedures were ordered so as to facilitate checks over Party branches and individual members. (5) New financial procedures were introduced which would prevent the personal use of official funds and other favors of corruption by senior Party members.

A second means of Party government fusion is placement of Party members in key administrative positions. On the regional level, for example, Liu Nan-t'ao, Chairman of the North China Administrative Committee under the Government

38. Ibid., July 9, 1952, p. 1.

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647 Administrative Council, was also the third secretary of the North China Party Bureau. Most of the commission chairmen under the regional committee were also Party leaders,[39] thus holding concurrent key positions in the two hierarchies.

Similar patterns are also seen at the provincial level. The then-Chairman of the Shansi Provincial Government, Ch'eng Ts' -hua, was also the First Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, so was Yang Chi-feng, of Hopei Province and Yang Keng-t'ien of Chahar Province. The governors of the present administration bear the same qualification. A governor of a province can either be concurrently the First Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, as is the case of Lin T'ieh of Hopei, or he may be the past First Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee of the same province, as is the case of P'ei Li-sheng of Shansi. The mayors of both Peking and Tientsin are at the same time First Secretaries of their respective Party Committees. P'eng Chen of Peking and Huang Huo-ch'ing of Tientsin.) -- See section of "Biographies of Key Personalities."

At lower levels, this fusion is even more obvious.

B. Cadre Utilization. Still another method through which the Party exercises its control over the administrative organs is in the selection and appointment of faithful and capable cadres

39. Chang Pan-shih, head of Dept. of Propaganda of North China Party Bureau, was con-
[continued next page]

665 (Party members as well as non-Party members)
647 to serve in the judicial, administrative and other State organs. The North China Bureau directive previously cited strengthened the Party's authority over personnel. The appointment of Party Secretaries to head personnel departments in government offices has further facilitated centralized amanagement.

After the promulgation of the Constitution, all personnel offices in government organizations were disbanded. This may indicate firmer control of personnel policies and their implementation by the Party.

C. Department of Supervision. Finally the Communist Party exercises direct control over government bodies through the offices of supervision, which were formerly under the People's Control Commission. Offices of supervision exist at all levels from the Central Government down to the county government and are strictly controlled by the Party. As a rule, the heads of these offices are either Party secretaries in charge of Party organization, or chiefs of public security agencies, which are watchful guardians for the Party. Personnel working in these offices are mostly Party members and activists. They carry out only Party directives.

Unlike the People's procuratore, which is called a "judicial organ," the offices of supervision are administrative organs; they investigate government employees to make certain that they have

[39. continued] currently Chief of Cultural/Educational Dept. of North China Adm. Committee. Appointment found: ibid., May 3, 1952, p. 6.

665 647 correctly executed government directives and are not guilty of misdemeanors, disobedience, or corruption in the administrative organs and state enterprises.[40] Since 1953 offices of supervision have concentrated their attention on financial and economic organizations where waste and corruption are reportedly increasing.

The highest supervisory organ in the North China Region before 1954 was the North China People's Control Commission under the North China Administrative Committee. Similar commissions were organized in the provinces and administrative districts. At the 1955 Supervisory Conference,[41] it was decided to concentrate on the organization of these offices in key cities and counties and on the strengthening of their work in financial and economic organizations.

Supervisory branches are the agents of the department of supervision of a provincial government.[42] They may be established in any state enterprise, or financial, economic, or transportation office. In addition to their normal control functions they supervise production expenditures and the observance of fiscal regulations.

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40. For functions of People's Control Commissions consult report in ibid., June 13, 1950, p. 3.

41. Report on Conference, Enlightenment Daily, June 13, 1955, p. 1.

42. People's Daily, January 6, 1953, p. 1.

665 Three aditional[43] agencies are also operated
647 by the supervisory offices: the supervisory reporters, the complaint boxes, and the reception rooms. People's supervisory reporters may be sent out by the supervisory agencies, or selected from within the organization being inspected. In the nation as a whole, more than 100,000 such reporters have been operating. They are organized into small working teams to spy on the individual workers and to make direct accusations or to accept charges received in complaint letters and interviews with accusers. The complaint box and the reception room are the two major means of encouraging mass accusation. All Party and government agencies are required to offer these facilities and to manage them according to strict rule

665 ## II. PARTY CONTROL OVER MASS ORGANIZATIONS

In utilizing the services of mass organizations for political advantage, Communist policies toward these organizations have been well calculated and effectively carried out. From the Party's point of view, mass organizations are political assets: (1) They serve as links between the Party and the masses. (2) They are the means through which the Party succeeds in organizing all sections of society. (3) Each of these mass organizations represents a specific segment of the populace and is

43. Ibid., February 20, 1953, p. 3; and Ibid August 3, 1953, p. 3.

665 itself a social and economic force.

Like the Party, mass organizations have enjoyed a special position in the North China Region for in "old liberated" areas, mass organizations had supported the Party in its underground movements, particularly those among women and youth. After the Communist assumption of power, they became open and were centrally organized under provincial leadership. Among the most influential mass organizations are the trade unions and the women's federations, which will be discussed in order to illustrate the pattern of Party control over mass organizations.

665 467 A. Trade Unions. Since trade unions form the backbone of the industrial development of North China, and since this area is one of the industrialized areas of China, control over them early became one of the foremost goals of the Party organization in this region.

Until August 1954, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions[44] was represented in the North China region by the North China Trade Union Working Committee. Under the regional committee, local trade union councils reach from the provinces to towns, and on to an administrative unit equivalent to hsiang, namely, an urban center of rural communities.

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44. Chinese text of the Constitution of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in People's Daily, May 14, 1953, p. 2.

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467 The basic trade union unit is similar to the Party branch. As a general rule, a committee is formed whenever the membership reaches twenty five. The basic trade union committee sets up workshop (department) committees to direct the work of the departments. Workshop committees may also be broken down into trade union teams in production units. Such an organizational pattern closely resembles that of the Party branch. The reason for the similarity in organization is to enhanve Party control and in turn to convert trade unions into effective and military organizations.

To destroy the old trade union leadership, the Party specifically launched a "democratic regorm" movement in all factories and associated the elimination of the old leadership with the suppression of counterrevolutionaries. However, "democratic reform" was milder in the North China region that in any other for two reasons: (1) Communist underground strength in the unions was greater than in other regions, and (2) it was of particular importance not to dislocate the economy of this region. Nevertheless, a new leadership was by degrees secured through propaganda and the rallying of mass support. As of May 1950, new management councils had been established in 78 out of the total of 123 unions in the province of Hopei.[45] In privately-owned factories, a so-called "collective contract" was signed with the owners, meaning the acknowledgement by private owners of the new trade union leadership.

45. Hopei Daily, May 1, 1950, p. 1.

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467 The methods employed by the Party for political control over trade unions are similar to those used to control other organizations. The subjection of trade union affairs to the direction of the Commission on Trade Unions of the Party Committee and the placing of Party personnel in key positions in the trade unions are customary practices at all levels.

However, the most effective method of control is the practice of the implementing of directives through the trade unions themselves,[46] in this manner: First, the Party branch formulates directives, working plans and personnel policies. Second the Party branch suggests to the presidium of the trade union council the issues to be discussed. Party members elected to the presidium guide the trade union meeting successfully and direct the passage of Party proposals by the presidium. Third, after the resolution is adopted, Party and Corps members must accept it unconditionally and serve as activists to make certain that it is carried out. Finally, Party branches in the trade unions were instructed that their primary tasks were the formulation and execution of production plans, and the assignment and fulfillment of production quotas. Party branches were also to supervise cultural programs for the workers to make sure that the "four safeguards" -- against spies, robbers, fire and sabotage-- function effectively in the factories.

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46. Ibid., March 17, 1951, p. 2.

665C. Federation of Democratic Women (FDW)
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Women's position in society is such that not only do they constitute an important part of the labor force, but their influence is extended to the entire populace. For this reason, women's federations are regarded by the Communists as a political force, and are so organized as to reach all corners of society.

In the villages, women's federations participate most actively in all rural functions, and supply most of the activists in all movements. Their participation in agricultural production should be particularly mentioned. As of March 1950, women's participation in production in the "old liberated" areas in Hopei Province was estimated to represent up to 80 per cent of the female population; even in the "newly liberated" areas, women's participation scored 54 per cent.[47] By March 1955, their participation in the agricultural producers' co-operative was particularly cited. In 5,200 of the 7,000 producers co-operatives in Shansi Province, women were either managers or deputy managers.[48]

In the cities, women's federation teams are organized in the streets and alleys. They engage actively in urban inhabitants' committee work, and in carrying out propaganda among the female populace. During the Three-Anti Campaign in Peking, women activists formed one-half of all

47. Ibid, March 10, 1950, p. 1.
48. People's Daily, March 8, 1955, p.1.

665 the activists in the city. The Communist Party's
562 attempt to organize women factory workers was also assiduous. As of October 1950, 54 per cent of the women workers in Hopei had joined trade unions; in cities like Paoting and Shihchiachuang, the percentage went up to 90 per cent.[49] In other fields of activity, women's participation was also high. As of March 1950, 4,470 women cadre also worked in government agencies in Hopei. Their participation in the People's courts was particularly great. Twelve per cent of the presidents of People's courts in Shansi were women

665 D. Other Mass Organizations. There are in
668 the North China Region a number of other mass organizations with a strong influence on society. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth has its representative offices in all key cities of this region. Its Tientsin office,[50] for example, was organized in January 1950. Branches of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles were also organized in all cities. However, the most popular organization among them all is the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Its Hopei branch[51] was officially organized in November 1950 with a membership of 350,000. In the North China Region as a whole,[52] the membership stood at 1,908,202 in April 1951, the highest of any region at that time.

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49. Hopei Daily, October 31, 1950, p. 2.
50. People's Daily, January 10, 1950, p.3.
51. Hopei Daily, Nov. 7, 1950, p. 1.
52. Ibid., April 15, 1951, p. 1.

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III. PARTY CONTROL IN THE RURAL AREAS

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Political power in the rural areas is the key to Communist power in North China. Here lies the strength and the weakness of the region, and of the Party; here the pattern of political dynamics is the most revealing, and the Communist power encounters the greatest opposition.

With the exception of the first few years prior to 1951, when a different set of policies was pursued by the Communists in the North China Region, the general pattern of the development of the Communist political power remained the same as in other regions. In the main, three periods can be: (1) the initial construction period--prior to the completion of land reform in the spring of 1950, when political power was centered in the Peasants Association; (2) the consolidation period -- a period of expansion in areas after land reform and consolidation of agricultural producers' co-operatives in other areas; (3) the election and post-constitutional period. The continuous suppression of opposition during the election of 1953-54, however, gave a firm base to Communist political power. The post-constitution period displayed a renewed consolidation of political power upon the basis of gradual collectivization of agriculture.

A. The Initial Construction (1948 Fall to September 1951)

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Prior to the convening of the First Conference

4/23 of County Head in North China[53] in September
•665 1951, land reform was the key task in the "newly liberated" areas, whereas in the "old liberated" areas, elections and consolidation of ts'un (village) People's representative conferences topped other business. Experiences gained from the election no doubt served ad models for the areas in the North China Region, as well as in the nation as a whole.

1. Land Reform and Political Construction. In the North China Region,[54] land reform was taking place in the "newly liberated" areas in four provinces: Hopei, Shansi, Chahar, and Pingyuan, but no in Suiyuan, between December 1949 and early 1950. As of April 1950, 25,500 villages (78 per cent of the total villages) in the "newly liberated" area announced the completion of land reform. Although land reform was carried out in a relatively mild way in the North China Region, it accomplished the political aims of abolishing the land-ownership system and of destroying existing political forces in the rural districts.

Owing to the rich experience available in this region and to the small area affected, land reform was rapidly concluded. Nevertheless, all available forces were mobilzed for the tedious task. In Hopei Province alone, land reform cadres of more than 20,000 were organized into teams.

53. Report on Conference in People's Daily, Oct. 3, 1951, p. 1. For resolutions adopted consult Yangtze Daily, Nov. 21, 1951, p. 4.

54. People's Daily, April 24, 1950, p. 2.

423 They included land reform "experts" from the
665 old liberated" areas, students, and workers from mass organizations. The land reform team of 469 serving in the suburbs of Peking,[55] for example included 135 such "experts." Another feature of the land reform in the North China region was the lenient policy adopted. For example, the establishment of people's tribunals was discouraged and their use was carefully handled so as not to avoid terror among the populace. This lenient policy was deemed necessary because of the proximity of this region to the national capital and of the large number of minority groups in this region.

During the land reform, power centers in the rural areas remained: (1) the Party, (2) the Peasant Associations, (3) the hsiang government, and (4) the militia. Of these four, the Peasant Association and the militia were of special importance.

413 The Peasant Association was the executive
668 agent of the land reform. It possessed the power
665 to decide all important questions relating to land reform. It was an organization primarily of poor peasants, who constituted two-thirds of the membership; the other one-third was filled by middle peasants. Prior to the active execution of the land reform, Communists attempted to include all poor and middle peasants in the Peasant Association and the membership was large. In Shansi province, it stood at 200,000; in the county

55. People's Daily, Nov. 23, 1950, p. 2.

668 423 665 of Yü-tsi 80 per cent of the peasants were members of the Peasant Association.[56]

665 423 701 The militia served as another instrument of terror at the disposal of the Party. It is an organization of poor peasants and farm laborers (67 per cent) and of youth (aged 18-30) and is strongly class-conscious.

At the end of the land reform in North China,[57] the militia's strength was placed at 2,371,900. In Shansi Province alone, it was 373,250 in November 1950. Needless to say, the militia in this region had participated in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese and later assisted the Communists to defeat the Nationalists. They were well-organized and had gone through several consolidations and readjustments. In addition to the normal duties assigned to the militia, such as guarding granaries, bridges and transportation centers and escorting food transportation, the militia was also expected to assist in coastal defense. In most cases, they were organized into teams, such as highway patrol groups, coastal defense squads, and village joint-defense teams. In the Paoting administrative district, 665 such village teams were organized among the 4,715 villages.[58]

665 623 2. Election of Ts'un (village) Peoples' Representative Conference and Political Consolidation in the "old liberated" areas. The election of

56. Ibid., April 24, 1950, p. 2.
57. Ibid., Oct. 25, 1950, p. 1.
58. Hopei Daily, August 1, p. 3.

665 623 ts'un People's representative conferences in the "old liberated" areas was the Communist attempt to consolidate rural political forces. It was an effort to strengthen the Communist hold and was taken immediately after the large scale Party training and overhauling launched in 1950. To strengthen the ts'un government, two measures were taken: one was the emphases of "key" village work,[59] and the other, the election of village People's representative conferences and village governments. While the "key" village plan was to create model villages where administrative experience might be gained, village elections were intended to overhaul old political set-ups and were carried out in all places within "old liberated" areas. As of March 1950 in Ting hsien, Hopei, 400 villages had completed village elections;[60] in the province as a whole,[61] 60 per cent of the villages had elected new village governments in November 1950.

The directives and plans calling for village elections were so elaborate that the concentrated efforts of all organizations was required.[62] The procedures followed in these elections were followed in the 1951 elections in the "newly liberated" areas and in the nationwide election of 1953-54. For this reason, the discussion of the 1950 election will be taken up in a later section.

665 634 3. Consolidation Period (August 1951-53). The convening of the First Conference of County

59. People's Daily, Jan.28,1950,p. 3.
60. Ibid., March 26, 1950, p. 3.
61. Report of Yang Shiu-feng, Chairman of Hopei Province, Hopei Daily, Nov.25,1950,p.2.
62. People's Daily, Jan. 28, 1950, p. 3.

665 634 Heads in the North China Region marked the Communists' further attempt to stabilize the region The careful preparation and the wide discussion before and during the Conference signified the importance of this Conference. The Conference heard three important reports made by the head of the North China Bureau of Affairs, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the First Secretary of the North China Party Bureau, and adopted a resolution outlining the ten tasks of rural administration. The Conference was also significant in that after this date administrative policies were made general in application; that is, the same policies were to apply throughout the region, in both "old liberated" and "newly liberated" areas.

The chief objectives set forth by the Conference were increase in agricultural production and consolidation of political power at the village and county levels. In most areas it was urged that county all-circle People's representative conferences act for the county Peope's congress which would not be elected until after the Constitution. At the village level, the transfer of political power from the Peasant Association to the ts'un government was accomplished. The transfer of power was marked by the overhauling of Party units and mass organization operating in the rural districts, the convening of ch'ü and ts'un Peoples' representatives converences, and the strengthening of ts'un government.

The convening of ts'un People's representative conferences in some of the "newly liberated" areas

665 repeated the 1950 experience. Election districts
634 were allocated largely according to the distribution of the mutual aid teams, but elections were held with an average participation of from 70 to 80 per cent of all the voters. The elected ts'un People's representative conference was comprised mainly of poor peasants.[63] A statistical report on the composition of 776 ts'un Peoples' representative conferences showed that poor peasants constituted 56 per cent, while middle peasants took 35 per cent. The remaining 9 per cent went to farm laborers (5 per cent) and to the handicraft workers (4 per cent).

623 The ts'un government was elected from the ts'un People's representative conference. It was to include commissions on civil affairs, finance and food, agricultural production, culture and education, sanitation, public security, militia, and other functions.

474 In the organization of mutual aid teams
665 among the peasants, high achievements were repeated in most provinces within the region. In Shansi, the organized peasants amounted to 55 per cent of the total peasant families. Hopei was the second largest with 49 per cent.[64] The other three provinces were poorly organized with 40 per cent for Pingyuan, 30 per cent for Chahar and 10 per cent for Suiyuan. The Communists did not attempt to increase the number of mutual-aid teams

63. Ibid., Aug. 10, 1951, p. 3.
64. Ibid., Dec. 30, 1951, p. 2.

474 and agricultural producers' co-operatives until
665 the nationwide drive of 1953-54. However, new mutual-aid teams continued to be organized in certain areas while consolidation of existing teams in other areas proceeded.

665 Along with the fulfillment of major assigned tasks there were programs to correct various abuses and laxities in rural districts of corruption and inefficiency, reported in the villages. The infiltration of the "reactionary" elements into the Party organization and the increase of newly rich among Party members were cited in many places. There were sign of general apathy among Party cadres caused by the low level of education which restricted the ability of the Party members to handle complicated tasks, and by the continuous overhauling and indoctrination imposed on the Party members this last had resulted in the demoralization and even loss of Party members. Of particular concern to the Party was the wu-to (five-too-many) phenomenon. Wu-to refers to too many tasks, too many conferences and training classes, too many forms, too many organizations, and too many jobs held by one person. The North China Party Bureau held a special meeting with a view to eliminating this phenomenon, and as a result, a directive was issued.[65] At this meeting many cases were cited: In Yü-tz'u county, Shansi Province, in a three-month period, 21 tasks were

65. Ibid., June 26, 1953, p. 1.

665 assigned; in Yen-san of Hopei, at a single cadre meeting 18 tasks were announced. A form designed by the Financial and Economic Commission of Shansi comprised 74 pages requesting explanations running to several thousands of words. The many jobs assigned to a person, amounting to an average of four or five jobs per person, and the many meetings a person had to attend, were causes of inefficiency in administration and demoralization of Party members.

665 681 C. The Election and the Post-Constitution Period.

The Communist announcement in 1953 of the forthcoming nationwide elections opened another chapter in political development. This announcement was evidence of the Communists' confidence in the stability of their power at the lower level of administration. Following the consolidation of their power at the ts'un level in 1950-51 and at the county and city level in 1951-52, the foundation was laid for the concentration of political power in the hands of the Communist Party of China.

In the North China Region,[66] the abolition of ts'un (villages) as administrative units and the reallocation of hsiang administrative units was designated as a task to be completed before the national election, and in the North China Region this was done. The

66. Ibid., May 31, 1953, p. 1 and ibid., March 6, 1953, p. 2.

665 631 The Hopei People's government ordered the setting up of reallocation offices at all levels of government under its jurisdiction and mobilized 12,000 trained individuals to complete the task. The major job of reallocation was the elimination of village units and the combining of them into hsiang units. In many cases, according to the report of May 1953, a county, originally made up of two hunded to six hundred villages, was reduced to 140 hsiang. In this way, control was more readily centralized and elections could be handled. Following the reorganization of hsiang administration, election districts were allocated. Voters were organized into teams and the representatives were elected for the Hsiang People's Congress.

After the promulgation of the Constitution in September 1954, Communist power was further strengthened at the basic level. The Hsiang People's Congress now holds the highest authority in the locality, but the true power remains with the Hsiang People's Council. These two institutions have gone through the two stages of construction and consolidation and Communist power is securely entrenched in the rural areas. However, the Communists have encountered serious resistance as a result of rural maladministration.

665 631 474 The overly rapid expansion of agricultural producers' co-operatives in this region throughout 1954 and the program to increase rural Party membership at the beginning of 1955 raised further problems. As a result, the Communists have had to take strong measures to stabilize the rural political conditions. By overhauling the over-expanded co-operatives and by strengthening Party

leadership in the rural districts, the Communsts hope to arrest further peasant resistance. 665 474 631

IV. PARTY CONTROL IN THE CITIES

Communist political power in the cities was established and consolidated by a program nearly identical with that employed in the rural districts. 665 633 The democratic reform movement and the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries, which were directed at the trade unions and at the urban populace as a whole, and the violent Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns , which were directed at the Party, the administration, the industrial and business circles of society, performed functions similar to those of the land reform program in the rural society.

Communist control in the city is maintained through Party control over organizations, extending from the trade unions to the students' federations, and reaching as far as the streets and alleys. The following is a brief discussion of the chief organizations found among the inhabitants of cities.[67]

The Urban Inhabitants' Committees were first organized in 1951 in the city of Tientsin, as an experiment. Their wide introduction in other cities throughout the nation was effectuated in January 1955 when a set of regulations governing their organization was promulgated by the Chairman of the People's Republic of China. The stated aim of the Urban Inhabitants' Committee was residing in or sharing a house with others, a committee represents from one to six hundred families.

67. Regulations of Committees in ibid., Jan. 1, 1955, p. 1.

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633 The Urban Street Office acts as a liaison between the government and the street and is the representative of the city government to the street; it checks on residents and imposes regulations. Its jurisdiction parallels that established for the Public Security Sub-Station, thus providing a double-check among the residents. The Public Security Sub-Station is responsible, in the main, for the maintenance of public order and the suppression of counterrevolutionaries.

As a "mass organization" Mediation Committees are established both in cities and in the villages. Their function is to mediate disputes among citizens, to propagandize government statutes, and for the time being to exercise "judicial" power in the village and street for misdemeanors not covered by the People's tribunal. Although the committee acts as a third party in a dispute, it represents the government view; it employs self-criticism as one of the primary techniques.

The Communist control in the cities is much more rigid and forceful than in the rural areas. The Communist domination over many mass organizations, factories, and other professional organizations also contributes to the stability of this political power. The many street organizations, particularly the public security Sub-Stations, in enforcing obedience and in spying on homes, play leading roles. However, the importance of other organizations, notably the procuratorates and the People's courts, should not be underestimated.

CHAPTER III. ELECTION OF MINOR PARTIES

I. ELECTIONS

665 Between April 1953 and July-August 1954,
666 the nationwide election which produced the Peoples' congresses at all levels was held in the North China Region between April 1953 and July-August 1954. The election was conceived as having two functions strange to Western students: first, it provided an excellent channel for government propaganda, with no choice of political platforms. Secondly, it was the occasion for political "struggle to liquidate the opposition and eliminate the unwanted.

A. The Election Committee Article 3 of the Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China,[68] stipulates that "deputies to People's congresses of a province, county, or municipality divided into districts shall be elected by a like Peoples' congress of a hsiang, town, municipal district, or municipality not divided into districts, shall be elected directly by the electors." The electoral law also provides for the establishment of election committees to conduct elections at all levels down to hsiang. Members of a Committee are appointed by the People's government at the next higher level.

68. The Electoral Law of the Peoples' Republic of China for the All-China Peoples' Congress and Local People's Congresses of all Levels, Peking Foreign Language Press, 1953.

•665 The function of the Hsiang Committee was
666 defined as follows in a directive issued in April 1953 by the Central Election Committee.[69] First, the chairman of the committee was to be appointed from the higher level. Second, the committee was to delimit electoral districts. Each district was to have a population of at least 200 and to elect two or three representatives. Third, a voter-qualification examination board was to be set up. Only those who passed the examination were to receive an electoral certificate. Committees at the hsiang level were in a position to control the selection of candidates through negotiations between the representatives on the Committee of the Communist Party and of mass organizations. While the elections to the People's congresses above the county level must be conducted by secret ballot, the election of deputies to the People's congresses of a hsiang, town, municipal district, and the election of a town deputy to a county People's congress may be conducted either by a show of hands or by secret ballot (Article 55). In the latter case, election meetings were held under the supervision of the election committee and every effort was made to force full participation. An average participation of 80 per cent was reported throughout this region.

Elections at county or hsiang levels were more successful in the North China Region than in any other region, largely because of the experiences gained in the past and the relatively stable political conditions existing in this region. A

69. People's Daily, April 6, 1953, p. 1.

large number of electoral officials were trained; 665 ●
1,378 of these trained personnel were organized 666
into teams and sent to assist in the election in 21 counties in Shansi Province alone.[70]

In the cities, the reallocation of election districts and the examination of voters' qualifications were the two most tedious tasks involved in the election. Generally, the reallocation of election districts was based on the distribution of public sub-stations and the examination of voters' qualifications was entrusted to urban inhabitants' committees. However, in both tasks the public sub-station played the decisive role. Similar problems occurred in the villages, but simpler rural conditions made the tasks easier.

The composition of the People's congress at hsiang and ch'u (within a city) levels showed the dominant position of the Communist Party and the working class. One report indicated that 8,729 out of a total of 19,379 People's representatives elected from 17 counties in Shansi were Communist Party members. In the mining town of Yang-chuan, among the 964 People's representatives, 42.3 per cent were workers. A similar pattern was also observed in Peking;[71] among the 1,200 representatives selected from 7 ch'ü, workers constituted 32 per cent of the total; other professions followed in this order: government personnel 15 per cent; lawyers and medical profession 15.2 per cent; engineers and technicans 14 per cent; co-operative workers 3 per cent; private industry and businessmen 9.8 per cent; religious workers 1.6 per cent, and urban inhabitants 20.5 per cent.

70. Ibid., Feb. 11, 1953, p. 3.
71. Ibid., April 25, 1954, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 12 North China
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665 B. Selection and Nomination of Candidates

666 Members of the Communist Party, the various democratic parties, the various People's organizations and electors not affiliated with the above-mentioned parties or organizations may all be nominated as candidates for election as deputies, either jointly through negotiation among the groups or separately by each party, according to electoral districts and electoral units. In practice, however, joint nomination is the rule and the caucus is adopted Negotiations on the nominations of candidates above the provincial and municipal level are conducted through the consultative conferences at their respective level. In counties and hsiang where such conferences do not exist, negotiations are carried out in the election committees. Whenever preliminary lists of the candidates have been agreed upon by the election committee, they are given to the electors' discussion group for approval and returned to the election committee. The final list is then published five days before the election.

C. Election Campaigns and Funds

The adoption of caucus as means of nomination eliminates the need for election campaigning, Candidates from other parties and organizations so selected must, of course, first meet the approval of the Communist Party. Once he is approved, his election is assured. If there should be any campaigning involved, it would take place only at the Party meetings and discussion group meetings, where the individual's qualifications might be

665 questioned and some interrogation might be
666 necessary. With respect to election expenses, Article 8 of the electoral law permits disbursement by the national treasury. Article 62 of the electoral law singles out bribery as an offense. Other unlawful practices, such as violence, intimidation, and fraud are offenses liable to fine and imprisonment.

II. POLITICS OF MINOR PARTIES

665 In the North China Region, minor parties are presented by their branch offices established after 1950 in the key cities in this region. The best known are the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang (RCKMT), the Chinese Association for the Promotion of Democracy (CAPD), the Democratic League (DL), the Chinese Peasants and Workers' Democratic Party (CPWDP), and the Chih Kung Tang (CKT).

As a party composed of former Kuomintang officials, the RCKMT composed of former Kuomintang leaders has the largest representation in North China government of any of the minor parties. The next largest representation is from the Democratic League. This is composed of the intelligentsia and other middle class elements, has been drafted by the Communist Party to participate in government as a symbol of coalition. The CAPD is the party of "the national bourgeoisie," meaning major industrialists and capitalists. Its service is called upon for active support in the nation's economic programs. Other minor parties having

665 some political importance are drafted for other activities.

The status of the minor parties in the government in this region is determined ultimately by their status in the central government. The status enjoyed by the minor parties changed after the promulgation of the Constitution. Although the Constitution calls for the continued functioning of the People's democratic united front led by the Communist Party and composed of various democratic classes, parties, groups, and People's organizations, these democratic elements in China, particularly the minor parties, are rapidly sinking into obscurity.

The local consultative committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which represent the united front, have ceased to be organizations of any political importance. The more than ten tasks assigned to them since 1951, ranging from assisting local governments, reflecting people's opinions, examining decrees submitted by the government, to participation in government-sponsored drives, have been reduced to mere observance and enforcement of the Constitution of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the holding of consultations over the local work of the People's democratic united front and its implementation.[72] (Article 18 of the Constitution of the CPPCC.) Equally significant is the reduction in the number of consultative committees below provincial level. The new constitution of the CPPCC calls for the establishment of these committees only in provinces

72. English text of Constitution of Conference in Current Background, No. 308, Dec. 25, 1954.

665 and in municipalities directly under the central authority.

Minor parties' participation in government has become meaningless as power at all levels has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party. For instance, the liquidation of private capitalists in the transition stage will unquestionably reduce the political position of the CAPD. Eventually minor parties will no longer exist as political forces in any ordinary sense.

A. Control and Infiltration.

The most effective way of eliminating minor parties and their activities is to exercise strict control over them, either through direct subjugation or infiltration. A glance at the guiding principles to be observed by all minor parties participating in the CPPCC indicates the degree to which these minor parties have subordinated thems themselves to the will of the Chinese Communist Party. In addition to the acknowledged position of the Communist Party of China as the core of the States power, minor parties "must assist the state organs and set the social forces in motion... maintain close contact with the masses...continue to consolidate and develop the alliance between China and the USSR...and study Marxist-Leninist theories on a voluntary basis, study state policy, elevate political levels, practice criticism and self-criticism and strive for ideological remolding." (General principle of CPPCC Constitution.)

The Communist Party's infiltration into the minor parties to hurry their final extinction

665 constitutes perhaps the most threatening scheme of the Communists. This is accomplished through the control by the Communist Party over membership policies of the minor parties. The resolution of December 1951[73] governing the expansion of the Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party placed many restrictions upon it. Clearly the expansion was aimed at strengthening the united front policy of the Communists, rather than at strengthening the minor parties. Expansion was permitted only in the cities; political activities of the minor party were prohibited in the units of the People's Liberation Army, public security forces, intelligence organizations, and offices dealing with foreign affairs and other agencies, for security reasons. Finally, Communist Party members and members of the New Democratic Youth Corps were permitted to operate within the minor party. This last condition, if carried out, would certainly ensure the minor party's extinction.

B. Minor Parties and "Pressure Politics"

The true nature of a democracy can be revealed by the character of minor or opposition parties and by the freedom of special interest groups to exert their influence. In Communist China, minor parties have only assigned duties to perform and public information is controlled by the Party; they can exert no pressure upon the state organs which the Communist Party of China dominates, nor do they take part in any key decision making that involves public affairs. Admittedly, deputies of the minor parties have made speeches and commented upon the past government at various

73. People's Daily, Dec. 10, 1951, p. 1.

665 Conferences. However, they merely expressed praise for the Communists, with occasional criticisms of faults the Communists themselves had admitted publicly.

CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS

In the North China Region, the Communist Party has succeeded in consolidating its political power, while performing the role of model for the other regions.

The present tasks assigned to the Party calling for rapid industrialization in the cities and gradual collectivization in the rural communities are tasks in which the Party must further prove its competency. The peasant resistance to the collectivization and to the increasing control over all activities in the rural districts is perhaps the most serious challenge to the Communist political power in the nation as a whole as well as in this region. Although the percentage of co-operatives is high in the North China Region (41 per cent of total peasant households in Shansi and 35 per cent per cent in Hopei), rural difficulties are also mounting. The succes or failure of the work of collectivization in this region no doubt will have great effect on the nation as a whole.

At present, peasant resistance to the forming of agricultural producers' co-operatives is due to the peasants' belief in individualism and to the Communist mal-administration; force and intimidation remain the two chief methods employed by

the Communist compel the formation of co-operatives. The Party members' low level of education handicaps the management of the co-operatives; they often face bankruptcy because of mismanagement. The mounting friction created because of differences in status and wealth between the poor peasants and the middle peasants who form the major part of the co-operatives further make efficient management of the co-operatives difficult. Popular resistance to Communist policies in the rural district was so serious that many remedial measures were taken in the first part of 1955. Yet despite the much-discussed overhauling of the co-operatives and the strengthening of rural Party organization, confusion still exists among the Party leaders. Mao Tse-tung's major speech in July 1955 calling for continuing effort toward collectivization may settle the differences [74] in the views held by Party members. Nevertheless, future difficulty can be foreseen and Party dissension on this point may seriously disrupt Party unity.

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74. Chinese Daily News

668 means severe penalties. Recently, the Communists attempted to improve their system of checking on the fulfillment of production quotas in order to eliminate the practice of submitting false reports of production achievements -- a strategy attempted in order to afford some temporary relief from mounting pressures.

2. Tension within Party Organizations.

668 Within the Party organizations themselves the increase in pressure and tension is most revealing of the harm done to morale. In the first place, the Party apparatus is the center of power and activity for the regime. All Party directives and government policies are implemented by the Party bureaus. A Party member is subject to at least two systems of pressure -- that of the Party and that of the state. Secondly, Party members are subject to such an endless program of Party indoctrination and rectification that many of them cannot withstand such pressure, resulting often in their expulsion from the Party. Many people, outwardly in favor of the regime, become reluctant to join the Party. Most of the people expelled from the Party are confined in prison or forced labor camps; but some of them remain at large and could conceivably have joined discontented groups. Unless evidence to the contrary is disclosed, it can be presumed that some of the expelled Party members are willing to unite with subversive elements in a concerted effort to oust the present regime.

3. Tension within Mass Organizations.

668 Party pressure on mass organizations also leads

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III. THE MASS PROPAGANDA NETWORK

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Besides conventional propaganda agencies such as the press, publishing houses, dancing and singing troupes, motion picture and film-strip projection teams, schools, cadre training centers, and dramatic troupes, another extensive propaganda and agitation apparatus operating in this region is the "mass propaganda network," consisting of so-called propaganda officers and reporting officers. This "propaganda network" is not a unique arrangement in the North China Region; like other propaganda devices, it is an integral part of antionwide organization. But, unlike many other propaganda organs, the mass propaganda network operates under the sole control and direction of the Communist Party of China, having no operational relationship with the governmental hierarchy. This network was established on a nationwide basis in pursuance of a directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued on January 1, 1951, "Decision Concerning the Establishment Throughout the Party of a Propaganda Network for the Masses."[18] It was designed to intensify and broaden the work of propaganda and agitation, making it a task not only for the working personnel in the formal propaganda organs, but for "every Communist."

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18. For its Chinese text, see People's Daily, Jan. 1, 1951.

A. The Propaganda Officer

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Propaganda officers are selected by the Party branch headquarters from among Party members, Youth Corps members, the masses in direct contact with the branch headquarters, model workers, and other active "revolutionary" elements willing to engage in propaganda work. In selection, consideration is given to the degree of political consciousness of the candidate, his sense of duty as displayed in his present work, his personal association with the masses close to him, and his potential ability as a propaganda officer.

Upon appointment, propaganda officers are given training in the ideology of the Party, propaganda materials and techniques, and other related matters. Training is conducted through so-called propaganda conferences, Party schools, and propaganda-officer training centers. Besides receiving training and instructions from Party authorities, the propaganda officer is also expected to study, on his own initiative, propagandist handbooks, news handbooks, newspapers, official documents, pamphlets, and other reference materials relating to his work as a propaganda officer.

The propaganda officer performs numerous functions including the dissemination and elucidation, under the direction of the Party and by simplest and most common of means, of current domestic and international developments; the

208 665 publicizing of the policies of the Party and the People's Government, and the duties of the masses, particularly those duties related to the time and locality in question, and the typical experience gained by the people in production and other kinds of work. Furthermore, the propaganda officer is to refute "reactionary rumors" and "mistaken ideas" prevalent among the popular masses, encourages the masses to make a study of typical experiences gained in production and other work, and to report the state of mind of the people in order to assist the Party in the choice of appropriate propaganda material.

Statistical data on the number of propaganda officers in North China is incomplete. We know that, as of February 1954, there were some 220,000 propaganda officers in Shansi Province.[19] It is estimated that the total number of propaganda officers in Hopei Province is about 300,000. Most of these propaganda officers operate in factories, towns, villages, agricultural producers' co-operatives, mutual-aid teams, and other mass organizations.

B. The Non-Party Propaganda Army

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The strength of the propaganda officers cannot be gauged on the basis of their numbers alone. It is to be noted that the propaganda

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19. Ibid., Feb. 11, 1954.

647 who have inferior technical or administrative training but who feel that their past sacrifices and contributions to the Communist cause entitle them to senior status.

KEY COMMUNIST PERSONNEL

647 Despite the apparent dislocation of some
665 Party men in favor of unaffiliated administrators, we find that top authority is not only definitely in Communist hands in North China, but substantially in the hands of men who are powerful on a national as well as a regional level. A brief glance at the positions of the eight Communists in the group of 13 senior officials indicates the extent to which this is true.

Po I-po, the well-known Communist leader long active in the North China area, is secretary of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and political commissar of the North China Military District (in addition to national posts on the State Council and 1st NPC). After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Po was commissioned by General Yen Hsi-shan to organize the Hsi-sheng Chiu-kuo T'ung-meng Hui (Self-Sacrifice Save-the-Country League), and after the occupation of Taiyuan by Japanese forces, he went to Southeast Shansi at the head of the first and second detachments of the so-called Chüeh-ssu Tsung-tui (Dare-to-Die

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665 Column). Early in 1949 he revolted against Yen Hsi-shan and went over to the Communist camp with all the forces of the Chüeh-ssu Tsung-tui. In 1945 Po was elected a member of the Central Committee of the CPC, and during 1948-49 he served as first vice-chairman of the North China People's Government.

Nieh Jung-chen, who holds the second leading post in the regional party organization, is commander of the North China Military District and of the Peking and Tientsin garrison forces, vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, and a member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC. During the Sino-Japanese War, Nieh Jung-chen was commander of the Communist forces in the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region. In 1948-49 he was commander of the North China People's Liberation Army and subsequently served as deputy chief-of-staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, former Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and concurrently a member of the Central Committee of the CPC is deputy-commander of the North China Military District.

The present regional position, if any, of Liu Lan-t'ao is not known, but he holds ranking positions on NPC committees and, as a reserve member of the North China Administrative Committee, probably outranks all but a

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647 few of the senior leaders.

665 The other four key Communists hold top positions in the provincial and municipal administrations. They are the mayors of Peking and Tientsin, the governor of Hopei and the chairman of the Shansi Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.

P'eng Chen, mayor of the Peking Municipal People's Government, joined the CPC in the 1920s and was active in workers' movements for many years. After serving for three years as chairman of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC and political commissar to Lin Piao's United Democratic Army, he became secretary of the Peking Municipal Committee of the Party in February 1949. In addition to his mayoralty, he is vice-chairman of the 2d National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and a delegate to the 1st NPC.

Huang Huo-ch'ing, secretary of the Tientsin Municipal Committee of the CPC, is also mayor of the Tientsin Municipal People's Government and a member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC. Lin T'ieh, governor of the Hopei Provincial People's Government, has been secretary of the Hopei Provincial Committee of the CPC and political commissar of the Hopei Provincial Military District since 1950. T'ao Lu-chia, the secretary of the Shansi Provincial Committee of the CPC, is also

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665 political commissar of the Shansi Provincial Military District, chairman of the Shansi Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and delegate to the 1st NPC.

These eight leaders, then, occupy the key positions in North China. Here, as in other parts of China, the central leadership of the CPC appears to keep a tight control over decisions in the regional and provincial government administrations. More detailed and revealing analyses of leadership patterns must await the availability of further biographical data.

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 AF12 North China AF12

the court. "Because of the inconvenience to the people" the separate court was abolished in the spring of 1914. Instead of having separate assessors, the judicial cases were handled by officers who were sent by the provincial government at the request of the magistrate. Ting Hsien had two such officers, one for civil and one for criminal cases.

The hsien government was reorganized again in 1928 after the forces of the Nationalist Government had taken Peking and unified the government and "the Republic had been established in the victory of the Revolution". There were then three sections and the four bureaus of public safety, finance, education, and construction. The First Section was in charge of police, fire protection, sanitation, health, relief, forest protection, and census. The Second Section was responsible for lands, agriculture, engineering, roads, bridges, waterways, labor, industry, business, schools, libraries, museums, and parks. The Third Section looked after the fiscal affairs of the hsien, appropriations for the hsien budget, taxes in money and grain, taxation on land, loans, public lands, local finance, audit, and the handling of hsien funds and hsien property. The work of each section was in charge of a section head, an assistant head, and from three to five clerks. The monthly salary of a section head was $60, of his associate from $30 to $40, of a clerk $11. The heads of the three sections and the four bureaus met weekly as the hsien government committee to discuss problems and plan for the improvement of the administrative program.

In 1928 another effort was made to establish a separate court of justice responsible to the high provincial court rather than to the magistrate. The court was organized with a judge, a judicial officer and five clerks, a prison staff of 12, a prison head, one matron, 10 guards, 10 judicial police, and 10 regular police. The budget of the court was $480 a month, or $5,760 per year. This was paid from the provincial treasury rather than from hsien funds.

In spite of the new organization the court was not entirely removed from the control of the magistrate. He generally was able to influence the high court in the appointment of the judge and he had to review and approve all court decisions before they were carried out.

The reorganization of 1928 added the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) Board and its subsidiary organizations to the hsien political machinery. Members of the Kuomintang had been working secretly in Ting Hsien from 1924, and thus were prepared to develop an organiza-

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 AF12 North China AF12

634 665 tion when the Party came to power, following the success of the Nationalist armies and the capture of Peking. The Party Board was the basic organization. It had 208 members: 82 teachers, 53 students, 20 farmers, 17 officers, 13 merchants, 5 officials, 2 soldiers, 2 policemen, and 14 others. The work of the Board was carried on by an Executive Committee with a secretarial organization, training and propaganda divisions, and an Inspection Committee. In 1929 the activities of the Board were supported by a grant of $16,800 from hsien funds.

The work of the Party Board was discontinued in 1930 because of political changes but it was begun again in 1931, after the military situation had cleared.

After its organization in 1928 the Board promptly set up five subsidiary organizations for farmers, merchants, laborers, students, and women. Each organization was to promote the interests of its special group. Executive and inspection committees usually were organized, but the subsidiary organizations evidently were set up primarily to function at the instigation of the Party Board. They were given no budgets and any incidental expenses of meetings and other activities were met from Party funds. They all sent representatives to conferences and rallies, parades, and committee meetings. Meetings of the anti-opium and the finance committees were specially mentioned.

467 Before 1928 labor unions were unknown in Ting Hsien. The old gilds had included both the masters and the men. After the establishment of the Party Board, labor unions were promptly organized and the General Labor Union of Ting Hsien was organized by the Tailors' Union, Shoemakers' Union, Silversmiths' Union, Carpenters' Union, and Barbers' Union.

As the Farmers' and Women's Associations covered the entire hsien the farmers had central, district, and village organizations, the women, central, district, branch, and sub-branch organizations.

634 185 The National Conference on Home Affairs, held in December, 1932, took hsien government reform as its central theme of discussion. The Conference recommended that an Institute of Political and Social Reconstruction be established in the provinces willing to experiment with the problem of rural reconstruction, that an Experiment Area be set aside as the laboratory of the Institute, and that the Area be under the direct and complete control of the Institute. This recommendation was enacted into law by the sanction of the Central Political Council, and

3:Chao E-5 (1939-1941)1948 AF12 North China AF12

Politically, P'ing-chiao-tsun is under the jurisdiction of the Peiping municipality. The protection of life and property of the villagers depends to a very great extent upon how well the municipal police functions in this district. On many occasions in the past when the police machinery was restrained or destroyed, the people of the village had to flee to the city for safety. Occasionally, arrests are made by the police because certain individuals are suspected of having joined the gang which steals jewels from tombs of Manchu nobles in neighboring districts or of having manufactured heroin or opium, or of some other crimes.

According to municipal regulations with slight modification in practice, the smallest political unit is the *chia* 甲 consisting of ten households; above this is the *pao* 保 consisting of ten *chia;* four *pao* at present join together into a *lien-pao* 連保; altogether the northern-suburban police district has twenty-three *lien-pao.* The chief function of this *pao-chia* system is to assist the police in maintaining order. The divisional heads of the *pao-chia* are appointed by the bureau of police of the municipal government. There are six *chia* in P'ing-chiao-tsun, but, strangely enough, one of the six heads of the *chia* does not have his usual residence in the village and no attention is paid to this by the police. The head of the *pao* is a resident of P'ing-chiao-tsun, but he is responsible for a district larger than his village.

Before the inauguration of this *pao-chia* system, the villagers were supposed to have local self-government, according to which the northern suburban district was subdivided into *fang* 坊 and *li* 里. The *fang-li* system had been abolished for some time, but it recently has been re-established and now exists along side the *pao-chia* system. The heads of the *fang* and *li* are appointed by the city mayor and are to assist the municipal government in collecting taxes, building roads and other works of construction. The head of the *li* is a resident of P'ing-chiao-tsun and is responsible for about fifty households. It happens that this *li*-head is also a *chia*-head.

In addition, there are the two systems of "road protection village" *ai hu tsun* 愛護村 and *ti-ch'u fen hui* 地區分會 or "regional subdivision". P'ing-chiao-tsun has a "road protection village" head who is also the head of the *pao* and is responsible to a Japanese officer in the railway station about a mile away from the village. The *ti-ch'u fen hui* system was only recently inaugurated by the Hsin Min Hui 新民會, the only political party in the Peiping-Tientsin political area. It takes over the green-crop tax-collecting function from the *lien-pao.*

4: Burgess E-4.5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12

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We are not always clear as to the exact nature of the reorganization here reported. It must be kept in mind that promoters of the modern labor movement are frequently students, other intellectuals or officials of the Peoples Party. The resultant reorganizations must therefore be characterized as from the top, down. There appears to have been a great desire on the part of certain southern governmental groups to secure the support of organized labor. The new structure, however, undoubtedly facilitates the growth of a self-conscious labor group.

In many other places in China besides Canton there has been an endeavor on the part of the Peoples Party (*Kwo Min Tang*) to organize labor into a unified body which would give political backing to their organization. Mr. Wang Wen Sen, a college graduate, a resident of Hankow, gave the following description of the methods of government agents in "reorganizing the guilds." In Hankow, in 1926, labor organizers went to the tailors and promised that if their guild were reorganized according to new rules, prices and wages could be raised and the guild officially represented in the Bureau of the Government which regulates labor. These agents also went to the employees working in the bathhouses and told them that if they would agree to the reorganization of the guilds on the lines desired, soap and towels for their patrons would thereafter be supplied, not by them, but by their employers. On the other hand, they assured the employers that they would support a demand for increased prices. They were also promised a representative in the Labor Bureau. These agents first attempted to persuade the workers and employers to carry out their plans. Later, if the suggestions were not complied with, they were given a definite date on which regulations must be obeyed. After that date delay was reckoned a legal offense. The Wuhan Printers Union in

4: Burgess E-4,5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12

ment. From these stipulations it is seen that there is a very direct relationship between the party and the workmen. But it must also be pointed out that the party has more laws and regulations on the labor unions than on the gilds. This may be explained by the fact that the Kwo Min Tang has been struggling hard to reorganize the gilds into unions, and that in as far as those regulations do not prohibit gilds they are also applicable to the gilds.

(2) Basis of organization is industrial rather than trade: This means that the Kwo Min Tang encourages the craft gilds to change into industrial unions, if it is possible for them to do so. In Nov. 1924, the late party chief promulgated trade union regulations, including the following provision, which in effect states that the party encourages the principle of organization of trade unions by industry, with the possibility, in view of the importance of handicrafts among Chinese industries, of organization also by craft. Here we see the party's emphasis upon industrial unions.

(3) Legality of the strike: The gild infrequently used the strike because strike as a method of improving the workers' condition was prohibited (and still is) by Chinese law—especially the Penal Code and police regulations. But in the labor union regulations of 1924 above referred to, the strike is declared lawful.

(4) Abolition of compulsory membership.

(5) Arbitration by government commission: This is provided for in the commercial and industrial disputes provisional regulations of Dec. 1926. The scope of these regulations covers four classes: merchants, small merchants in handicrafts (who employ three men or less per shop), labor unions and public utilities. The arbitration board is organized as follows: One member is appointed by the government, two members are selected from the interested parties. If the dispute involves more than two parties their delegates may be increased. When a decision is handed down by the commission, it is binding on all parties concerned, and the government will enforce the decision by compulsion if necessary.

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*441 *467 665 Now in order to understand the Kwo Min Tang regulations above given, certain other regulations of the Republic[1] may be mentioned:

(1) Apprenticeship: in Merchant Regulations, it is declared that commercial apprenticeship is effected by contract. The employer must train the apprentice regarding the trade, and also give time for education. In case the contract is not signed, terms of apprenticeship may also be determined by custom or trade regulations.

(2) Employers associations: There are two types of such organizations in China: One type is provided for in the Chamber of Commerce Regulations, which were promulgated in Feb. 1916; another type is provided for in the Industrial and Commercial Association Regulations, which were promulgated in April, 1918, and revised in April, 1923. In the last-named regulations, it is explicitly stated that these regulations are not applicable to the laborers, including the workers in the handicrafts. In other words, laborers cannot be taken in as members of these associations. But for the present, the guilds are permitted to exist.

*441 *467 *Summary.*—Some of the outstanding trends of guild transformation both in Peking and in other parts of China which we have been describing in the last eight sections may be summarized briefly as follows:

Some types of guilds are disappearing, while on the other hand certain new guilds of workmen manufacturing or selling new types of commodities are being formed on the old lines of organization. Some craft guilds are changing their processes of manufacture to meet new demands. In many guilds there is coming to pass structural differentiation, the employers and the laborers forming their own respective groups either voluntarily or by compulsion of law. Especially in South and Central China many of the guilds

[1] The reference is to the Peking Republican Government first established in 1912.

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is to be organized into a political area with a village head, and several associates according to the number of families. Above this village is to be the district office under a head who serves as a link between the self-governing villages and the official county government. This district head is also the head of the local police. The election of the village head is supposed to take place at a mass meeting, but in Ching Ho only the leaders were present and no formal vote was taken, and the office was taken by the associate of the former village head, with a leader in the Association for the Protection of Green Crops, as associate head. The district head has not yet been elected, and the work is being done temporarily by the police head who is a government officer, and under the direct control of the county police office, thus destroying the very essence of self-government. In an effort to remedy such a position the provincial government has decided to open training schools for district heads, so that men may be trained to serve in their own dis tricts. Not much has been done in the matter of village self-government, except the re-establisbment of the local guard.

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3. Local Party.

When we use the wor l "Party" we always mean the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party, as that is the only Party in China at present. In November, 1928, the County Party Organnisation appointed a board of directors of three men : one standing member, one training member, and one publiciy member, to organise the members of the Party into a formal Party

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665 organisation; but unfortunately there are only seven Party members in the whole district, and they do not not need much organisation. Therefore the first work that the directors assumed was the formation of a Merchants' Union; followed by the setting up of a Farmers' Union, and then a Women's Union. They succeeded in getting more than a dozen people into the first two Unions, but they failed to get sufficient members for the Women's Union.

In addition to this work the Party members formed a Financial Committee which was approved by the County government. This Committee audited the accounts of the old Self-government Association, and found many errors. Therefore, they asked the police to arrest the deputy of the village head who had been in charge of the financial affairs, and finally he was fined $120. The old secretary was dismissed also, and the Committee took over the financial affairs of the town. Although all this was done in the name of the citizens yet the Committee was composed mostly of Party members, acting on behalf of the Party.

At the beginning of 1929 the formal organisation of the Party was completed but because of its small numbers it could not really be ranked as a District Party organisation although it is situated in the centre of the district[1], so it was given the rank of a branch Association. Three executive officers were elected by the members, one of whom became principal of

(1) According to Party Regulations a minimum of fifteen members is required to form a District Party Organisation.

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the local school so that the Party gained control of 665
of the school affairs as well as the finance. Unfortunately this additional power was the collapse of the whole organisation. As we have described in Chapter IX a training school for rural teachers was started by the Party, and after three months' training the majority of the graduates were found positions in the various rural schools, but there were not enough positions for all. Those who were not successful in finding a post became discontented and accused the Party members of graft in the placing of the graduates. There was a demonstration and the Party members were driven from the town. At present the Party office is closed, the members have returned to their occupations, and the Party machinery is suspended after only five months of very active work.

4. Public Finance.

As the work of local gvernment has been divided 652
amongst the district government, the village government and the Chamber of Commerce, we find that local finance have been very much mixed up too. There are three different sources of revenue ; taxation levied by the District goverment on grain sales, sale of fruit and vegetables and of live stock, and the toll on pack carts and animals ; from taxation and contributions from the stores ; and the contribution from the Chamber of Commerce, and the Association for the Protection of Green Crops. Fortunately the investigator was able to get posspssion of the book which had been kept by the old Self-government Association, and a detailed analysis was made for the preceding year :

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Since the coming of the Party to the town, the members have organised a financial commitee in the name of the citizens to take over the financial business of the whole town and district. The day after its establishment the members went over to the self-government offices and took possession of the books. They spent two or three days in auditing the books and found out many faults, so they arrested the deputy of the village head who did most of the work for both the village government and the district government, and he was fined $120 and released.

This committee has five executive members and 17 ordinary members. One good action they have undertaken is the publication of all accounts every month, and the following is their financial report for the first month of their administration. Although this only covers the first eighteen days yet the expenses are practically complete for the whole month, and we can thus take this account to represent the current month.

TABLE XLVIII. FINANCIAL REPORT OF NOVEMBER, 1923

INCOME	Amount	EXPENDITURE	Amount
From self-government	$117.04	Police station	$284.60
Special contribution	15.20	Financial committee	13.64
Students' fees.	7.50	School	15.33
Grain tax	270.03	Party organisation	120.00
Fine from Li	120.00	Street cleoning	10.00
How Chuan grain tax	12.50	Miscellaneous	51.20
Road tax	121.00		
Welare tax	3.50		
Daily tax	15.00		
Watchman's fee	5.50		
Miscellaneous	18.50	Balance	196.20
Total	691.27	Total	691.27